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Abstract
This paper investigates empirically the effect of import diversity on government
size and provides evidence for the love of variety effect on government spending de-
scribed in Hanslin (2008). I argue that crowding out of firms is an important cost
of public good provision. However, due to the access to foreign varieties, national
costs of public good provision are lower and therefore, public good provision is higher.
Especially for OECD countries this channel seems to exist. The diversity of imported
products has a positive effect on government consumption, particularly when these
goods are classified as differentiated. In addition, this positive effect is decreasing
in home market size. Further, the direct effect of the share of differentiated in total
imported products on the government share is negative.
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1 Introduction
Through the increasing international integration of goods markets new challenges for the
public sector arise. On the one hand, a large literature points out that an increase in
competition between countries puts pressure on governments and leads to a race to the
bottom. An increasing integration of markets erodes the tax base and therefore tends to
increase the costs of public goods provision. On the other hand, governments have the
possibility to increase public good provision on costs of foreign countries. The literature
discusses two channels, how costs of public good provision can be exported: (i) due to the
terms of trade effect (TOTE) and (ii) the love of variety effect (LOVE).
The TOTE is discussed in the theoretical contributions by van der Ploeg (1987),
Turnovsky (1988), Devereux (1991) and Anderson et al. (1996). They show that in open
economies the costs of taxation can be exported if changes in public spending influence
the terms of trade. Anderson (2006) and Epifani and Gancia (2009) argue that increas-
ing integration of goods markets reinforces this effect which leads to larger governments.
The terms of trade effect (TOTE) may be illustrated as follows. Since the public sector
has a stronger home bias than the private sector, a shift from private to public expendi-
ture increases the demand for domestic goods. This in turn leads to a crowding out of
exports and to an increase of domestic prices. Epifani and Gancia (2009) find empirical
evidence for the TOTE. That is, the positive effect of openness on the share of government
consumption is conditional on a low elasticity of substitution.
The second channel, the love of variety effect (LOVE), I highlighted in an earlier theo-
retical paper (Hanslin, 2008). In a Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman framework, if the public sector
produces a consumption good and employs the same resources as the private sector, an
important cost of the public sector is its negative effect on the number of firms. However,
with integrated goods markets consumers have access to foreign varieties. Therefore, the
national costs of public good provision in terms of utility are lower and optimal public
good provision is higher in open economies than in closed ones. One crucial assumption
for this result to hold is that consumers have a love of variety. Almost three decades ago,
new trade theory starting with Krugman (1979, 1980), Ethier (1982) emphasized on the
importance of gains from trade due to the import of new varieties. It took some time until
first empirical studies quantified these gains from variety. Broda and Weinstein (2006)
show that imports of new varieties at a very disaggregated level brought welfare gains to
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the United States arising from a decrease in the consumer price index. In Broda and We-
instein (2004) it is shown that new imported varieties on the four-digit level have lowered
prices and brought an increase in welfare for many countries. In another study Broda
et al. (2006) show that there are productivity gains in various countries arising from new
imported products.1
The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence for the LOVE and
hence, the following hypothesis deduced from Hanslin (2008). First, a broad access to
foreign varieties should increase the government share relative to GDP. Second, if love of
variety is high, the government share should be small. This follows from the high costs
of public good provision if there is high love of variety. Third, since gains from variety
are larger the smaller the country, country size should be negatively correlated with the
government share. Fourth, the positive effect of imported varieties on government share
should be smaller the larger the country.
This paper differs from most existing empirical literature discussing the effect of trade
openness on government size mainly in the measure for openness. In a seminal paper
Rodrik (1998) finds a positive effect of openness (export plus import relative to GDP)
on government spending. Other literature (e.g., Garrett, 2001; Epifani and Gancia, 2009)
confirms this positive relationship, although different theoretical considerations lie behind.
The standard measure of openness does not allow to distinguish between exports and
imports and neither between the intensive and extensive margin.2 This paper focuses on
the extensive margin of imports. This allows to match the gains from trade to the gains
from variety and hence, a close test of the aforementioned theoretical model.
The measure for the diversity of imports is obtained by counting the different imported
products from the rest of the world. A product in this paper is defined at the four-digit
level of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) code, Revision 2, reported
in the NBER U.N. trade data by Feenstra et al. (2005). Unfortunately, there is a change
in reporting trade in 1984. While from 1964 until 1983 each product independent of the
trade value is reported, from 1984 until 2000 low valued trade flows below $100’000 are
not reported. Because of data reliability and the before mentioned censoring, the main
1The empirical evidence provided in Broda and Weinstein (2004, 2006) are closer to Krugman while
Broda et al. (2006) provide evidence for the Ethier-framework.
2A bulk of international trade is driven by the extensive margin. The importance of the extensive
margin in exports is quantified in Hummels and Klenow (2005) where it is found that 60% of greater
exports of larger economies is due to variation in the number of exported products. To my knowledge,
there is no study quantifying the extensive and intensive margins for imports.
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focus is put on the early OECD sample covering the years from 1964 to 1983.
Estimating panel fixed effect regressions for OECD and non-OECD countries and dif-
ferent time spans, I find strong and very robust results for the LOVE in the early non-
censored OECD sample. The number of different imported products has a positive effect
on government consumption as a share of GDP. This positive effect works especially if it
is accounted for the number of differentiated3 imported products. Further, in line with
the theoretical model, I find that the positive effect of new imported varieties on govern-
ment consumption is decreasing in country size. In addition, the share of differentiated
imported products affects government consumption negatively. I argue that the share of
differentiated products in the consumption basket is positively correlated with the love of
variety and therefore, costs of public good provision are higher.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple version of the theoretical
model of Hanslin (2008) from which four testable implications are derived. Section 3
describes the empirical model and the data. Section 4 presents the main results and
section 5 provides robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 A simple model
This section presents the theoretical framework in order to illustrate the LOVE on govern-
ment spending highlighted in Hanslin (2008). In order to focus on the main implications
I concentrate on the simplest possible version.4
There are two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ), which differ in the amount of labor
endowment (country size). In each country there is a private and a public sector, both
producing consumption goods. The public sector employs a share gi (i = H,F ) of labor
endowment L¯i and produces the nontraded public good according to a linear production
function, Gi = giL¯i. The representative household’s income is given by wiL¯i, where wi
denotes the wage rate in country i. Net income - income available for consumption of
private goods - is given by Ii := wiL¯i − Ti, where Ti = giwiL¯i is the income tax imposed
by the government. The private sector is characterized by a continuum of industries of
measure 1 indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. In each industry and country various firms produce
differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. Each firm is a monopolist for one
variety, after having incurred some fixed cost. There is free market entry, that is, the
3According to the classification by Rauch (1999).
4A richer version of the model is found in Hanslin (2008).
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equilibrium number of firms in an industry is endogenously determined. I assume free
trade between the two countries in an exogenous fraction of industries τ ∈ [0, 1] and
no trade for the remaining fraction 1 − τ . Without loss of generality I refer to trading
industries with index j ≤ τ and to the nontrading industries with index j > τ .5
The representative household derives utility from consumption of different varieties in
each industry and the country specific public good G. Household’s preferences for private
goods versus the public good is captured in the parameter η ∈ (0, 1).
Ui = η
∫ 1
0
log [Yij ] dj + (1− η) log [Gi] for i = H,F (1)
where subutility Yij is a CES aggregator of the varieties consumed in industry j
Yij =
(∫
k∈Nij
(
yikj
)ν
dk
) 1
ν
, i = H,F, (2)
with ν ∈ (0, 1). ν < 1 implies that the household has a love of variety. yikj denotes
consumption of variety k in industry j by the representative household in country i. The
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties from industry j is given by σ = 11−ν .
The assumption ν ∈ (0, 1) implies σ > 1. Within any industry j > τ , the household
can only consume varieties produced in the own country, within an industry j ≤ τ , the
household consumes all varieties produced in both countries. An increase in τ implies
broader access to foreign varieties and, because of love of variety, an increase in utility.
Nij is the index set of all varieties from industry j which are available in country i.
Since the elasticity of substitution between the subutilities Yij is equal to 1, the household
allocates net income equally among all industries. Moreover, since the measure of all
industries is equal to 1, expenditures per industry equal net income Ii.
Each firm in an industry produces one variety with labor according to the following
production function with increasing returns to scale
xkj =

A(Lkj − L∗) if Lkj ≥ L∗
0 otherwise
(3)
where xkj denotes output of firm k in industry j located in country H or F . Lkj is
the labor input of an individual firm, A denotes labor productivity and L∗ the overhead
5This way of modeling openness is due to Epifani and Gancia (2009).
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labor needed to run the plant. Because of the fix cost the firms have an incentive to
specialize and the number of firms (ni) equals the number of varieties. The assumption of
monopolistic competition with free firm entry within each industry implies for the price
of each variety, quantity and the number of firms respectively
p =
w
Aν
, x =
AL∗ν
(1− ν) , ni =
(1− gi)L¯i
L∗
(1− ν) . (4)
Because firms are identical and countries differ only in country size and government share,
output per firm x and price p are equal for all firms and independent of country of produc-
tion.6 The government employs giL¯i for public good production and (1 − gi)L¯i remains
available for production of private goods. The price p and the quantity per firm x are
independent of government activity and equalized between the two countries. However,
since the endowment left for the private sector is decisive for the number of firms in the
market, an expansion of the public sector reduces the number of active firms.7
In order to determine optimal public good provision the indirect utility of the repre-
sentative household is maximized. The government share in the foreign country is taken
as given.
max
gi
ητ log [Yi,j≤τ (gi, gi′)] + η(1− τ) log [Yi,j>τ (gi)] + (1− η) log [Gi(gi)] . (5)
s.t.
Yi,j>τ (gi) = (ni(gi))
1
ν x
Yi,j≤τ (gi, gi′) =
(
Ii(gi)+Ii′ (gi′ )
Ii(gi)
) 1−ν
ν
Yi,j>τ (gi)
(6)
where Ii(gi) = ni(gi)px. This optimization problem results in the following first order
conditions:
ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
1− gi −
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)L¯i′/L¯i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−η
ν
1
1− gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− η) 1
gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0 , (7)
for i, i′ ∈ {H,F} and i 6= i′.
The third term in equation (7) represents the positive marginal utility of a higher
supply of the public good. The second term represents the marginal utility loss due to the
6Wages are equal between the two countries as in equilibrium the following must hold pH
pF
=
(
xF
xH
) 1
σ
.
7Note that the TOTE is excluded.
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crowding out of private firms in tradable and nontradable industries. The first bracket is
positive and dampens the negative effect of the second term. This positive effect comes
from the fact that domestic public good production affects only the number of domestic
firms - not the number of available foreign varieties. Since households have a love of
variety, subutility in open industries is higher than in closed ones. Due to the crowding
out of domestic firms, the number of domestic relative to foreign varieties decreases which
increases the relative utility gain in open industries. The dampening effect (first term in
(7)) is larger the more varieties the country imports (measured by τ). Further, it is larger,
the stronger is the love of variety and the smaller the country.
Since households have a love of variety (ν < 1), an increase in τ reduces the national
cost of public good provision. For instance, a decontrol of protected industries or new
technologies which make trade more feasible in certain industries may be reflected in an
increase in τ . An opening of industries enables access to new varieties and therefore,
households’ utility increases.
According to equation (7) we can conclude that costs of public good provision are low
if the country imports a lot of different varieties (τ large), if love of variety is low (ν large)
and the country is relatively small (L¯i low). Since the share of government consumption
is higher the smaller the national costs of public good provision, the following holds in
equilibrium (applying the implicit function theorem to equation (7)):8
∂gi
∂τ
> 0 , (8)
∂gi
∂ν
> 0 , (9)
∂gi
∂L¯i
< 0 . (10)
Further, gains from imported varieties are smaller, the larger the country:
∂2gi
∂τ∂L¯i
< 0 . (11)
3 Empirical Model and Data
The empirical work attempts to provide evidence on the following hypothesis:
i. The number of imported products has a positive effect on the government share if the
8Proofs of these results are found in Hanslin (2008).
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imported products are differentiated. (see eq. (8))
ii. A high share of differentiated products in imports implies a low government share.
(see eq. (9))
iii. A high GDP implies a low government share. (see eq. (10))
iv. The positive effect of imported products on the government share is decreasing in
country size. (see eq. (11))
Although τ is a bilateral measure for openness, what drives the result are the welfare
gains from new imported varieties. While the hypothesis i, iii and iv should be intu-
itively clear, hypothesis ii requires an explanation. I argue that the composition of the
consumption basket and therefore also the composition of the imported products provide
information for the country’s preferences. If the share of differentiated on total imported
products is large, households value differentiated goods more. This in turn implies that
love of variety (LOV) is high. The theoretical model predicts that LOV has a negative
effect on the government share because of higher costs of public good provision. Therefore,
we should observe a negative correlation between the share of differentiated imports and
the government share.
In view of the aforementioned hypothesis the following equation is estimated.
git =β1importdivit + β2 (importdivit × loggdpit) +
β3diffit + β4 (importdivit × diffit) +
β5loggdpit + β′6Xit + ηt + µi + it
(12)
where i indexes countries, t indexes time, git denotes government consumption as a log
share of GDP, importdivit is the number of different imported products (normalized),
diffit is the share of differentiated on total imported products, loggdp is log of GDP, other
time varying potential covariates are included in the vector Xit, ηt are time fixed effects
(controls for global shocks), µi denotes country fixed effects (controls for time-invariant
omitted-variable bias) and it is the idiosyncratic error term.
The data is drawn from various sources. Following the previous studies on openness and
government spending, as for instance Rodrik (1998) and Epifani and Gancia (2009), the
measure for government size (g) is government consumption as a share of GDP from Heston
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et al. (2006) (Penn World Tables 6.2, henceforth PWT).9 Figure 1 plots the unweighted
sample means of the share of government consumption over time for OECD10 and non-
OECD countries separately. A few things stand out. The share of government consumption
is much lower in the OECD subsample. The peak around 1993 in the OECD subsample
is due to Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. The jump in 1970 in
the non-OECD sample is mainly due to the high government share of countries for which
data on the government spending is only available for 1970 and onwards.
In this paper a product is defined on the four-digit level. The measure for import
diversity (importdiv) used in this empirical study is the number of different imported
products from the rest of the world, normalized by the sum of all traded products in the
world between 1964 and 2000.11 Let J jit = 1 if country i imports a strictly positive amount
of product j in year t and zero otherwise.
importdivit =
∑
j J
j
it∑
i
∑
t
∑
j J
j
it
where the denominator is equal to 1069 for the time period 1964 to 2000. The data
source for the measure of import diversity is the NBER U.N. trade data by Feenstra
et al. (2005) where imports and exports are reported in the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) code, revision 2, at the four-digit level. The disadvantage of these
less disaggregate four-digit trade flows is that the increase in the number of varieties is
underestimated. However, since we are primarily interested in providing evidence for the
LOVE, we are more concerned about qualitative than quantitative effects. The advantage
of the four-digit data is its insensitiveness against false increases due to splitting of product
categories and “replaced” products due to technological progress. Endogeneity might not
be a big issue in this case since variation on four-digit level are driven rather through trade
liberalization than changes in demand (see Kehoe and Ruhl (2009)). Further, goods on
this aggregate level are more differentiated. This implies that consumption of an additional
9According to Rodrik (1998) this measure includes only government consumption and no public invest-
ments or income transfers.
10From the OECD sample Luxembourg is dropped since trade data are only available for Belgium-
Luxembourg. We treat Luxembourg as negligibly small and assign the combined information to Belgium.
Results are robust concerning the exclusion of Belgium. The observations of Norway for the second period
are dropped since the trade data shows a curious pattern. Results are also robust if Czech and Slovak
Republic are excluded.
11The only reason for the normalization is to obtain a measure between zero and one. importdiv = 1
implies that a country imports each four-digit product which has been traded at least once between 1964
and 2000 between any two countries.
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variety brings about larger gains. The distribution over time of the diversity measure is
provided in figure 2.
The share of differentiated imported products is computed using Rauch (1999)’s liberal
classification.12 Rauch (1999) divides commodities into three categories: Differentiated
goods, reference priced goods and goods traded on organized exchanges.13 According to
Rauch (1999): “Possession of a reference price distinguishes homogeneous from differ-
entiated products. Homogeneous commodities can be further divided into those whose
reference prices are quoted on organized exchanges and those whose reference prices are
quoted only in trade publications.”14 Broda and Weinstein (2006) provide estimations
of the elasticity of substitution for the three commodity groups which are summarized
in table 18. They find that the average elasticity of substitution of goods classified as
differentiated is much lower than the one of goods traded on organized exchange. Goods
classified as reference priced have (on average) a slightly higher elasticity of substitution
than differentiated goods and a much lower elasticity than goods traded on organized
exchange. Therefore, countries with a large share of differentiated goods have on average
a lower elasticity of substitution. Based on these elasticities, it is not obvious that one
should focus on the group of differentiated goods only. It can be argued that the group
classified as differentiated captures too few differentiated goods. However, the group of
reference priced goods is quite heterogeneous concerning the estimated elasticities and may
contain a too broad set of goods. Nevertheless, since the difference between the average
elasticity of substitution of reference priced goods and differentiated goods is very small, I
distinguish between two measures for the share of differentiated imports. The restrictive
measure diffr stands for the share of differentiated commodities while the liberal measure
12Rauch (1999) distinguishes between the liberal and conservative measure. He writes: “Because ambi-
guities arose that were sometimes affect the classification at the [...] four-digit level, both ‘conservative’
and ‘liberal’ classifications were made, with the former minimizing the number of [...] four- digit commodi-
ties that are classified as either organized exchange or reference priced and the latter maximizing those
numbers.”
13The shares of four-digit products falling into these liberal classifications are 55%, 28% and 18% re-
spectively.
14Examples of differentiated goods are: newspapers journals, periodicals; spectacles and spectacle frames;
footwear; blouses of textile fabrics; telecommunications equipment; cutlery; woven fabrics; fresh or dried
figs; non alcoholic beverages; etc. Reference priced goods are, for instance: fresh milk and cream; frozen
fish fillet; fresh apples; natural honey; cigarettes; electric current; etc.
10
diffl for the share of differentiated plus the share of reference priced goods. More formal:
diffr =
∑
j d
jJ jit∑
j J
j
it
diffl =
∑
j(d
jJ jit + r
jJ jit)∑
j J
j
it
where dj = 1 (rj = 1) if product j is classified by Rauch as differentiated (reference
priced) and equal to zero otherwise. Figure 3 plots the distributions of the two measures
over time.
Real GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars at 2000 prices (Laspeyres) is
drawn from PWT. Other variables drawn from PWT are population and the widely used
measure for trade openness which is export plus import as a share of real GDP in constant
prices. According to the previous literature trade openness is lagged one period to reduce
the endogeneity problem. Both variables are logarithmized and in the following referred to
logpop and lagopenness. Further potential covariates for which it is controlled for are the
political regime (polity2 from the Polity IV dataset), dependency ratio (depend) to control
for demographic characteristics, urbanization rate (urban) and whether the country was
affected by or involved in violence and wars (war). The polity2 is an composite Polity
index which ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). It is
the difference between the Polity Democracy index and the Polity Autocracy index (both
ranging from zero to ten). The dependency ratio, which is the share of population below
15 and beyond 64, relative to the population between 15 and 64, is constructed using
World Development Indicators from World Bank (henceforth WDI). The urbanization
rate (the share of population living in urban areas) is also drawn from WDI. The measure
for violence/war is ACTOTAL from Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and
conflict regions which ranges from zero (no violence) to ten. This composite index consists
of international violence and war, civil violence and war and ethnic violence and war.15 A
detailed list of sources and definitions for each variable is provided in Appendix B.
The unbalanced panel data covers 156 countries (the full list is reported in Appendix B)
of a time span from 1964 to 2000. Unfortunately, there is a change in reporting trade flows
in the World Trade Data between 1983 and 1984. After 1984 trade flows below $100’000 per
year were not reported in the original data from United Nations. However, Feenstra et al.
15In order to obtain an idea for the dimension of this measure, United States, for instance, have an
ACTOTAL equal to 2 in the years 2003 and 2004.
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(2005) indicate that some adjustments had been made for these low valued trade flows.
This break can be seen clearly in figure 2, where the distribution of the variable importdiv
is plotted over time. The difference between the OECD and non-OECD countries is
distinct. While the sample average among OECD increased after 1983 it dropped for
non-OECD. Further the distribution for non-OECD after 1983 is much broader than it is
before, especially there is a much longer tail at the bottom. This indicates that for many
developing countries a lot of low valued trade flows were not reported and therefore, the
number of imported varieties is underestimated for many countries.16 The distribution
for the OECD sample has increased only slightly. The reason for this upward jump may
lie in the different data source. If this structural break in importdiv is only a level effect
we control for it with the inclusion of time dummies. However, this figure suggests that it
seems wise to look at the different time and country sample separately.
All variables are computed as four year averages, except the last period which covers
five years. Hence, there are five periods from 1964 until 1983 and four periods from 1984
to 2000. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics (sample means, standard deviations and
extreme values) of the variables, separately for OECD and non-OECD and the two time
periods.
4 Regressions
According to the theoretical model we have the following predictions on the coefficients
in equation (12). We expect β1 to be positive if we do not include the interaction term
importdiv × diff . If we include the interaction term, β1 should not be significantly
different from zero while β4 should be positively significant. The reason is, that import
of new varieties does only bring gains from trade if the goods are differentiated. And the
more so, the more differentiated the varieties. β2 is expected to be negative, since the gains
from variety should decrease in the country size.17 The sign of β3 is also expected to be
negative. The share of differentiated goods in the import basket implies that differentiated
16A further reason for the underestimation of the number of imported goods might be that after 1984
there are only 72 reporting countries. For the non-reporting countries import data is only available through
the export information of the reporting countries.
17Existing theories about how country size may affect the share of government consumption is manifold.
Assuming that the public good is a normal good we should expect it to increase with GDP. According to
Wagner’s law the government share should increase as the economy develops. According to Alesina and
Spolaore (1997) larger countries have a smaller government share due to economies of scale in public good
provision. Empirical evidence for these hypothesis is given in Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) where it is
shown that the share of government consumption is smaller in larger countries and that small countries
tend to be more open to trade.
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varieties are more important for the consumer, indicating a higher love of variety. A high
love of variety implies that there are high national cost of public good provision. The
parameter for market size loggdp is expected to be negative. Because of the interaction
term of GDP with the diversity of imports, β5 might also become insignificant as the
parameter β2 captures the lower gains from trade if the country is larger.
The analysis starts with a baseline regression of pooling all countries and time periods.
The main focus, however, lies on the OECD country sample with special weight on the
first period where data quality is best and the multicollinearity problem is less severe.18
Baseline Regression
Table 3 presents regression results for the whole country sample. In addition to time
dummies, the dummy variable oecd×after84 allows for different structural breaks between
the two country groups (as suggested by figure 2). Further, in all columns it is controlled
for level of development and country size, that is log GDP and log population.19 GDP is
negatively and log of population positively significant, implying that GDP per capita has
a negative effect.
In the first column the number of imported varieties is insignificantly different from
zero. Including the interaction term of importdiv with log GDP in column (2), increases
the effect of importdiv to 1.9 while the interaction term is negative. Both variables
are significant at the 1% level. The interpretation of this result is in line of the above
constructed hypothesis. An increase in the number of imported varieties increases the
government share. However, this increase is lower, the larger the country. In column (3)
and (5), the shares of differentiated imports (the restrictive and liberal measure respec-
tively) is included controlling for the love of variety. In both column it is negative and
significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively. The negative sign is also in line with the
theoretical model and the hypothesis mentioned above. Further, in columns (4) and (6)
the interaction term of importdiv with diffr and diffl respectively is included. Against
the hypothesis the interaction terms are negative. However, the coefficient of importdiv
increases from 1.9 (2.1) to 4.4 (6.0) implying that there might be a problem of multi-
collinearity. Note that the interaction terms are highly correlated with the levels. In sum,
the effect of an increase in importdiv is still positive.
18The correlation of some important variables for the early OECD sample are given in table 2.
19Note that since GDP and population enter in logs, controlling for log GDP per capita is redundant.
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Table 4 shows the results with a full set of control variables. The results of the main
measures of interest do not change much. Similar to the findings of others (e.g., Rodrik,
1998; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Epifani and Gancia, 2009) lagopenness is significantly
positive. The variables polity2, depend and urban are not significantly different from
zero. The violence/war index (war) is positively correlated with the share of government
consumption.
Table 3 and 4 report the baseline regression including OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries. However, the data quality within and between these two country groups may differ
substantially. It is apparent from figure 2 that not only the pattern over time for the
number of imported products is very different for the two country samples, but also that
within group heterogeneity is much higher in the non-OECD sample. It might be sensible
to look at the two country groups separately. Since the OECD country group is much
more homogeneous and, on average, data is more reliable, the following analysis gives
special weight to the OECD countries.
OECD
Table 5 reports a first set of regressions for the OECD sample according to equation (12)
including some selected controls. In order to control for the jump in the trade data in 1984,
time dummies are included in each regression. In column (1) to (5), the main measures
of interest have the expected sign according to the hypothesis derived from the model.
In column (7) importdiv gets negatively significant at the 5% level. In sum however,
the effect of an increase in importdiv is still positive for the average country. Excluding
importdiv (column (6) and (8)) does not alter the main message but reduces the problem
of multicollinearity and lowers the standard errors. This is the case since the number of
imported varieties is highly correlated with the number of differentiated imported varieties.
As table 6 shows, the results of the variables in bold (except loggdp) are not robust and
depend heavily on the chosen set of controls. Later on it is shown that, when fixed effects
are different for the two periods, results stay more robust.
In contrast to the finding of many authors that trade openness (export plus import
as a share of GDP) has a positive effect on government size, for the OECD countries this
seems not to be the case. For OECD countries lagged openness is negatively significant
at the 1% level.20 Since in table 3 lagged openness is positive and in table 5 negative, the
20Rodrik (1998) already found the different pattern between richer and poorer countries. He argues
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positive effect of openness on government size is driven by non-OECD countries.
How we should deal with the structural break in the explanatory variables is not
that obvious. Including time dummies is clearly a necessary procedure. However, if
the change in reporting trade is country specific, the country fixed effect in the early
period differs from the one in the second period. The tables 7 and 8 report the results
if we allow the country fixed effect to change between the two periods.21 This procedure
doubles the numbers of groups. A country’s data before and after 1984 are considered
as observations from two different countries. However, standard errors are clustered by
country. An argument for a change in country fixed effects might be that censoring trade
flows below $100’000 affects small countries differently than large countries. Table 7 does
not control for additional covariates. In contrast to table 6 loggdp is not significantly
negative anymore. Column (2) in table 7 implies that an increase of import variety has a
positive effect on government consumption for the average country.22 However, for large
countries the overall effect would be negative. In column (4), diffr and the interaction
term importdiv × diffr are included. importdiv gets insignificant and the interaction
term is positive and highly significant. This means that the positive effect of imported
varieties works especially if goods are differentiated. If the share of differentiated goods in
the imported good basket increases, implying that love of variety increases, government
consumption decreases. Columns (6) and (7) show the same specification as in (3) and (4)
with diffl instead of diffr. Columns (5) and (8) report the results excluding importdiv
since the number of imported goods and the number of differentiated imported goods are
highly correlated. If we compare column (4) with (5) and (7) with (8) it can be observed
that the standard errors decrease fairly strongly. Generally it can be said that for the
average country the number of imported products has a positive effect on the government
share.
The estimation is quite robust with respect to the inclusion of further controls (table
8). Overall (except diffr in column (3)) the effects are slightly smaller but mostly keep
that the positive relation between trade openness and government spending is due to the external risk.
According to Rodrik (1998) developed countries react with an increase in public employment and work
programs, which is reflected in an increase in government consumption. However, developed countries have
social welfare programs. Since social security is not included in the measure for government consumption
from PWT, we should not necessarily find an effect there.
21Consider a fixed effects estimation of yit = βxit + ci + D84 + uit, where D84 is a dummy equal to
zero for the first period and equal to one for the second period and ci is a country fixed effect. It follows
that E(yit|βxit, ci, D84) = βxit + ci +D84. If a structural break in the explanatory variable xit is country
specific, D84 insufficiently accounts for the break in xit. In order to account correctly for country specific
breaks, the country fixed effects should be interacted with the period dummy.
22 ∂g
∂importdiv
= 12.824− 0.638× loggdp
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their expected sign and do not lose significance. Quite the contrary, some even gain in
significance (especially diffr and diffl). In column (4) importdiv is still positively sig-
nificant (at 5% level), despite the inclusion of the interaction term importdiv × diffr.
It can be argued that since diffr does not take into account all differentiated products,
there are still differentiated products captured in importdiv. In column (8) importdiv
gets negatively significant, correcting somehow for what importdiv × diffl overstates the
effect of differentiated imported varieties. The interaction terms are very interesting from
a theoretical point of view. Empirically, however, it incorporates some problems of multi-
collinearity.23 In order to reduce the problem of multicollinearity columns (5), (6), (9) and
(10) exclude importdiv. The estimation of the number of differentiated imported varieties
in column (5) is much higher than the coefficient for importdiv in column (3). Interest-
ingly, controlling for lagopenness (compare (5) with (6) and (9) with (10)) increases the
estimations of the variables in bold and reduces their standard errors. Comparing the
interaction term importdiv× loggdp and diff in table 6 with tables 7 and 8, the specifica-
tion which allows fixed effects to be different for the two periods yields much more robust
results with respect to the inclusion of controls.
The results so far are quite convincing that the LOVE exists in the data. Neverthe-
less, the sources of trade data for the two periods are different and low valued trade flows
below $100’000 are not reported in the later period. In the early sample no censoring
has taken place. A closer look on the early sample seems appropriate. Table 9 and 10
provide estimation results for the OECD sample and the period from 1964 to 1983. In
table 9 results without further controls are shown. The estimated coefficients are quite
similar to the regression in table 7. The results are robust with respect to further con-
trols as it can be seen in table 10. While in column (3) importdiv is significant at the
5% level, in column (7) importdiv is not significant. We may argue that the interac-
tion term importdiv × diffr does not capture all differentiated products and therefore
importdiv stays significant. Since diffl is a less restrictive measure of differentiated prod-
ucts, importdiv × diffl captures a broader set of differentiated imports. According to
column (3) the effect of importdiv on the share of government consumption is positive for
the average country and equal to 2.21.24 As g is in logs, an increase in importdiv of 1
23We should always have in mind, that multicollinearity between the explanatory variables is large.
Especially between importdiv and importdiv×diff which is 0.97 and between importdiv and importdiv×
loggdp which is 0.95.
24 ∂g
∂importdiv
= 5.493− 0.532× loggdp+ 13.308× diffr = 2.21 if loggdp = 18.93 and diffr = 0.51.
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percentage point (say from from 0.5 to 0.51) - which is an increase of approximately 11
new imported products - implies that the government share increases by 2.2 percent.
As column (4) and (8) show, the inclusion of additional controls (the diversity of
exports (exportdiv) and the volume of imports (imports)) does not change sign and sig-
nificance of the coefficients of interest. Both variables could potentially be correlated with
government size and number of imported products.25 When a country’s production is
concentrated on a few industries (this might be reflected in a smaller range of exported
products) the range of imported goods may be larger. Further, the number of imported va-
rieties and the volume of imports are positively correlated, the effect of import diversity on
government spending could just capture the effect of higher import volumes. Accounting
for import volume (imports) indicates that this concern is unfounded.
I already mentioned that multicollinearity is an issue we have to be concerned about.
Although in the early OECD sample multicollinearity is less severe than in the other
samples, importdiv × diffr and importdiv are highly correlated. The interaction term
importdiv × diffr is nothing else than the number of differentiated imported goods. So
far both terms have been included in order to show that the number of differentiated
imported goods are more important than the number of all imported goods. Table 11
provides the results with the number of differentiated imported goods (importdiv×diffr)
instead of importdiv. Results show that without the interaction term importdiv × gdp
the effect of the number of differentiated imported goods is positive but only weakly
significant when we do not control for lagopenness (column 1). Introducing lagopenness
as a further control reduces the effect of the number of differentiated imported products
which is still positive but not significant (column (2)). A robust result is that a high love of
variety (diffr) reduces the share of government consumption. In column 3, the interaction
term importdiv×gdp is significantly negative while the number of differentiated imported
goods is positive and highly significant. The positive effect of additional imported goods
is decreasing in home market size.
Results for the late OECD sample are provided in table 12. Columns (1) to (4)
indicate that the number of imported varieties has a positive effect on the government
share (importdiv and importdiv× diff are positively significant). Moreover, the effect is
stronger if the imported goods are differentiated. The first four columns also show that
25Cameron (1978) argues that countries where production is concentrated on few industries are stronger
hidden by an external shock. When government provides insurance against these risk, the government
share is larger when industries are concentrated.
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the government share decreases in home market size (loggdp). Columns (5) to (7) test the
other hypothesis. However, the estimated coefficients and standard errors are quite large
which is probably the result of the high collinearity between the levels and interaction
terms.
Non-OECD
Finally, the non-OECD country sample is examined. The data among non-OECD coun-
tries is much more volatile. Separate regressions for the two time periods leads to in-
significant estimators.26 The number of observations is too low for the degree of volatility.
Therefore, only results for the whole time span are reported. Analog to the OECD sample
the first regression shows results with constant country fixed effects (table 13) and the
second allows the country fixed effects to be different between the two periods (table 14).
According to table 13 the number of imported goods has a positive effect on the share of
government consumption and the effect is decreasing in country size. In the first column
of table 14 importdiv is significant at the 5% level implying that the government share for
countries with a broader set of imported goods is larger. In column (7) the coefficient on
the number of differentiated imported products is higher than in column (1) on importdiv.
This indicates that the effect of imported goods is stronger if they are differentiated. In
column (8) the coefficient gets closer to the one in column (1) as the liberal measure
comprises a broader set of goods (including less differentiated ones) than the restrictive
measure. In the other columns the signs of the coefficients on the variables of interests are
“correct”, however, not significant. This is most probably a result of the high collinearity
between the levels and their interaction terms.
5 Robustness
The results so far indicate that the love of variety effect on government consumption may
exist. In order to minimize the possibility that the findings above are a coincidence and
a consequence of certain specifications, this section presents various robustness checks for
the early OECD sample.
26Results not reported.
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Log specification
Whether one should logarithmize or not is often a difficult question. We should be aware
that with taking logs some functional form is imposed and results may depend upon
taking logs. For instance, Rodrik (1998) logarithmized all shares and found a positive
relationship between lagged openness and government consumption. Alesina and Wacziarg
(1998) replicated Rodrik’s regression with and without logarithmized government share
and with a more or less similar country sample. They find that openness is significantly
positive with log ratios, however it is not significant in levels. My motivation of using
log government shares comes from the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the governments.
Solving equation (7) for two symmetric countries (L¯H = L¯F ), the shares in both countries
is identical and equal to
g =
1− η
1 + η 1−νν (1− τ/2)
.
Taking logs of both sides we obtain
log g = log(1− η)− log(1 + η1− ν
ν
(1− τ/2))
For realistic values of the elasticity of substitution (σ > 2, i.e. ν > 0.5) the expression
(η 1−νν (1− τ/2)) is small and therefore, the following equation holds approximately:
log g ≈ log(1− η)− η1− ν
ν
+ η
1− ν
ν
τ/2
.
However, in view of the different findings depending on taking logs mentioned above, it
is reasonable to check for robustness of this specification. Table 15 provides the results and
confirms that the log specification does not drive the results. If we compare the estimations
for the variables in bold, they keep their expected sign and are highly significant. Note
however, that the coefficient of lagged openness is now insignificantly different from zero
while it is significantly negative under the log specification.
Dynamic panel estimation
One may argue that the share of government consumption reacts rather slowly on changes
in the economic environment and therefore past realizations of the dependent variable may
affect its current level. In order to capture this persistence a lagged value of government
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consumption is included on the right-hand side of the estimation equation.27 Table 16
shows the results with one-step Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimator for the early OECD
sample, one lag of government share on the right hand side and first differences in the
other variables. It is corrected for heteroskedasticity in the error terms by robust standard
errors.28 This method assumes that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced errors. The null hypothesis of first and second order autocorrelation in the
error terms is rejected. The results show some persistence in government consumption.
The coefficient on lagged government share is around 0.3 and significant at the 5% level.
Nevertheless, the estimations of the main measures are strongly robust and do not lose
their significance. Note, however, that in contrast to table 9 lagopenness has lost its
significance.
Alternative measure for importdiv
Further, an objection might be that only counting the number of different products im-
ported from the rest of the world is biased towards counting too few products. There
might be also gains from consuming both German and Italian cars. An alternative to
the importdiv measure used so far is to distinguish between the countries of origin as
well. Column (1) to (3) in table 17 show the results with this alternative measure which
counts a good manifold if classified as differentiated by Rauch (1999). For example, the
product category “passenger motor cars, for transport of passengers and goods” is clas-
sified as differentiated. If a country imports cars from Germany and Italy, the product
category “passenger motor cars, for transport of passengers and goods” is counted twice.
Finally this new measure is logarithmized.29 Hence, the coefficient on importdiv can be
interpreted as an elasticity. According to column (1) a 1% increase in imported varieties
implies a 0.1% increase in the share of government consumption for the average country.
For the smallest country in the sample, a 1% increase in imported varieties would even
increase the share of government consumption by approximately 0.5%. Since this new
measure already accounts for differentiated goods, the interaction term importdiv× diff
27In order not to loose observations through the introduction of the lag, the first observation for govern-
ment consumption is the average of 1960-1963.
28The instruments seem to be valid as the null of Sargan test of the one-step homoskedastic estimation
is not rejected.
29The mean of this new measure is equal to 8.36, standard deviation is 0.51, min and max are equal to
6.88 and 9.36 respectively (these figures are for the OECD sample and the early period).
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is, due to a multicollinearity problem, not included in the regression.30
Alternative measure for diff
Using the share of differentiated imports is one alternative to proxy the love of variety.
According to Dixit-Stiglitz, the love of variety is inversely related to the elasticity of
substitution. Since there is literature providing estimations of the elasticity of substitution
(see Broda and Weinstein, 2006), we may take use of them. Consider the following inverse
of a weighted elasticity of substitution:
lovit =
(
sditσ
d + sritσ
r + (1− sdit − srit)σh
)−1
where sdit (σ
d) denotes the share (elasticity) of differentiated goods and srit (σ
r) the share
(elasticity) of reference priced goods and σh the elasticity of homogeneous goods. For the
elasticity of substitution, the average of the two periods provided in table 18 is taken, that
is σd = 4.95, σr = 6.85 and σh = 13.45. As we would expect, the correlations between the
two diff measures and lov are very high: corr(lov, diffr) = 0.91 and corr(lov, diffl) =
0.89.
The regression results for this alternative proxy for the love of variety are found in
table 17 column (4). Again, the results are extremely robust. While importdiv is not
significantly different from zero, its interaction term with loggdp is negatively significant
and its interaction term with lov is positively significant. The new proxy lov itself is
negatively significant.
Yearly data
In order to exclude the possibility that the results depend on averaging the data, the
last three columns in table 17 provide the results with yearly data including all controls.
Concerning the significance the results are extremely robust. However, the magnitude of
the estimated effects differs slightly if we compare them with the results in table 9.31
30If the interaction term importdiv × diff is included, the estimations of the main variables of interest
(in bold) become insignificant.
31Results (not reported) are robust if I take only every 4 years. This is suggested by Acemoglu et al.
(2008) who prefer to take every 5 years to averaging over 5 years since averaging introduces additional
serial correlation.
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6 Conclusion
The possibility of open countries to export costs of public good provision to foreign coun-
tries through the terms of trade effect is well known. Empirical evidence indicates that
this channel exists and that open countries have bigger governments because of the terms
of trade externality.
Accounting for differentiated goods, love of variety and endogenous firm entry, the
other side of the coin is the possibility to export costs of public good provision through
the variety effect. If the crowding out of firms are important costs of public good provision,
access to a broad range of foreign products dampens national costs of public good provision.
This paper provided empirical evidence for this theoretically intuitive channel - referred
to as the love of variety effect on government spending.
The main focus of the empirical analysis lies on the OECD country sample and the
time span 1964-1983 where trade data are not censored. For this sample the results are
very robust. The number of imported varieties has a positive effect on the share of the
public sector. This positive effect is mainly driven by goods classified as differentiated.
Intuitively this is what we would expect, since the gains from new imported goods are
larger when goods are differentiated. Further, I find that the positive effect of imported
varieties decreases in country size. The intuition behind this finding is that national costs
of public good provision in large countries are dampened relatively less. Last but not least
the share of differentiated on total imported products is negatively correlated with the
government share. The share of differentiated imported products is taken as an indicator
for love of variety. National costs of public good provision are large if love of variety is
high since crowding out of domestic varieties “hurts” more.
To conclude, the results show that OECD countries fit quite well the theoretical frame-
work and that they take advantage of the LOVE. Moreover, some weak evidence is also
found for non-OECD countries that they increase government spending when the number
of imported goods rises. Hence, this paper provides further empirical support that fiscal
externalities due to trade liberalization leads to larger governments. Fiscal cooperation
would be necessary to reduce government spending and achieve higher global welfare.
The intention of the paper is not to discriminate between the terms of trade effect
and the love of variety effect. By focusing on the extensive margin of imports, this paper
provides first evidence that government expansion reacts positively on the number of im-
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ported goods and a high love of variety induces governments to reduce their expenditures.
The obtained results show that the LOVE is not negligible. In order to obtain insights
on the relative importance of the two effects, the TOTE versus the LOVE, further analy-
sis on the “openness and government size”-issue should distinguish between the intensive
and extensive margin of imports (and discriminate between developing and developed
countries).
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A Appendix
Figure 1: Sample means of government consumption as a share of GDP
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Figure 2: Distribution of impordiv
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics
OECD non-OECD
<1984 ≥1984 <1984 ≥1984
g mean (std) 2.80 (0.27) 2.89 (0.29) 2.96 (0.49) 3.08 (0.46)
[min,max] [1.95,3.44] [2.04,3.57] [1.60,4.23] [1.38,4.35]
importdiv mean (std) 0.51 (0.05) 0.66 (0.06) 0.41 (0.09) 0.36 (0.16)
[min,max] [0.36,0.74] [0.41,0.72] [0.06,0.71] [0.03,0.68]
diffr mean (std) 0.51 (0.02) 0.57 (0.02) 0.56 (0.04) 0.63 (0.05)
[min,max] [0.45,0.57] [0.55,0.67] [0.49,0.79] [0.51,0.84]
diffl mean (std) 0.81 (0.02) 0.85 (0.02) 0.85 (0.03) 0.89 (0.02)
[min,max] [0.79,0.86] [0.84,0.93] [0.78,0.99] [0.82,0.97]
loggdp mean (std) 18.93 (1.43) 19.42 (1.43) 16.30 (1.70) 16.69 (1.78)
[min,max] [14.56,22.36] [15.42,22.92] [11.26,20.72] [11.28, 21.57]
logpop mean (std) 9.60 (1.42) 9.74 (1.41) 8.40 (1.83) 8.65 (1.81)
[min,max] [5.26,12.37] [5.49,12.54] [3.78,13.82] [3.67,13.79]
polity2 mean (std) 6.35 (6.47) 8.48 (3.72) -3.49 (6.29) -0.52 (6.52)
[min,max] [-9,10] [-7,10] [-10,10] [-10,10]
depend mean (std) 0.60 (0.11) 0.51 (0.06) 0.86 (0.14) 0.77 (0.18)
[min,max] [0.46,1.03] [0.40,0.84] [0.42,1.15] [0.38,1.17]
urban mean (std) 67.69 (16.58) 73.40 (12.56) 37.33 (23.54) 46.19 (23.67)
[min,max] [24.13,95.61] [38.20,97.19] [2.31,100] [5.04,100]
war mean (std) 0.22 (0.68) 0.18 (0.67) 0.93 (1.93) 1.23 (2.30)
[min,max] [0.00,3.75] [0.00,4.00] [0.00,14.00 [0.00,14.00]
lagopenness mean (std) 3.33 (0.63) 3.76 (0.54) 3.95 (0.76) 4.09 (0.72)
[min,max] (1.73,4.66) [2.52,4.93] [1.95,6.41] [1.42,6.44]
Table 2: Correlations: OECD, <1984
importdiv diffr diffl loggdp importdiv×diffr
diffr -0.1905
diffl -0.24 0.94
loggdp 0.47 -0.32 -0.45
importdiv×diffr 0.94 0.15 0.08 0.37
importdiv×loggdp 0.91 -0.24 -0.34 0.79 0.84
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Table 3: All countries: 1964-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv 0.163 1.934*** 1.941*** 4.366*** 2.145*** 6.040***
(0.115) (0.642) (0.638) (1.208) (0.641) (2.251)
importdiv×loggdp -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.139*** -0.117*** -0.135***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039)
diffr -0.775** 0.047
(0.322) (0.443)
importdiv×diffr -3.121**
(1.339)
diffl -0.797* 0.444
(0.464) (0.813)
importdiv×diffl -4.019*
(2.219)
loggdp -0.201*** -0.162*** -0.156*** -0.153*** -0.160*** -0.163***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
logpop 0.262*** 0.248*** 0.254*** 0.250*** 0.253*** 0.253***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073)
oecd×after84 0.032 0.063* 0.074** 0.073** 0.066* 0.062*
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150
# countries 156 156 156 156 156 156
R2 0.141 0.148 0.154 0.159 0.151 0.154
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4: All countries: 1964-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv 0.155 2.727*** 2.566*** 5.940*** 2.743*** 9.129***
(0.132) (0.848) (0.862) (1.582) (0.840) (2.887)
importdiv×loggdp -0.151*** -0.145*** -0.191*** -0.152*** -0.190***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.053) (0.048) (0.052)
diffr -0.651* 0.441
(0.361) (0.478)
importdiv×diffr -4.078***
(1.546)
diffl -0.084 1.974**
(0.521) (0.961)
importdiv×diffl -6.372**
(2.642)
loggdp -0.229*** -0.172*** -0.165*** -0.162*** -0.172*** -0.180***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053)
logpop 0.328*** 0.307*** 0.305*** 0.296*** 0.307*** 0.302***
(0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.100)
oecd×after84 0.005 0.047 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.038
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
depend -0.169 -0.178 -0.129 -0.152 -0.175 -0.211*
(0.126) (0.125) (0.128) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126)
polity2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
urban -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
war 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
lagopenness 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.080*** 0.099*** 0.086***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 987 987 987 987 987 987
# countries 140 140 140 140 140 140
R2 0.176 0.186 0.191 0.198 0.186 0.193
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 9: OECD, 1964-1983
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv -0.337 13.827*** 12.733*** 6.521** 10.492** -9.202*
(0.402) (3.174) (2.981) (2.524) (4.163) (5.025)
importdiv×loggdp -0.688*** -0.619*** -0.866*** -0.507** -0.634***
(0.144) (0.140) (0.129) (0.203) (0.166)
diffr -1.539 -10.247***
(0.963) (1.891)
importdiv×diffr 20.364***
(4.790)
diffl -2.382 -15.016***
(1.563) (3.153)
importdiv×diffl 26.536***
(6.774)
loggdp -0.157 0.005 -0.025 0.059 -0.073 -0.035
(0.130) (0.133) (0.138) (0.115) (0.143) (0.123)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 132 132 132 132 132 132
# countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
R2 0.279 0.426 0.444 0.514 0.445 0.515
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 11: OECD, 1964-1983
(1) (2) (3)
importdiv×diffr 1.007* 0.673 12.820***
(0.604) (0.467) (2.657)
diffr -3.091*** -3.018*** -7.996***
(0.914) (0.694) (1.276)
importdiv×loggdp -0.337***
(0.074)
loggdp -0.479*** -0.263** -0.097
(0.115) (0.124) (0.121)
logpop 0.734*** 0.252 0.159
(0.236) (0.189) (0.178)
depend 0.562** 0.281 0.201
(0.234) (0.209) (0.204)
polity2 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
urban 0.007 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
war 0.038** 0.030** 0.013
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
lagopenness -0.281*** -0.277***
(0.042) (0.040)
Time Dummies yes yes yes
# Obs. 127 124 124
# countries 26 26 26
R2 0.678 0.786 0.811
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 13: non-OECD, 1964-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv 1.404* 1.509** 4.298*** 6.070*** 5.779*** 2.552**
(0.750) (0.753) (1.342) (1.853) (1.971) (1.108)
importdiv×loggdp -0.073 -0.086* -0.116** -0.189*** -0.198*** -0.150**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.065) (0.071) (0.065)
diffr -0.869** 0.048 0.414 0.309 -0.659
(0.360) (0.469) (0.532) (0.531) (0.417)
importdiv×diffr -3.641** -4.528** -3.793**
(1.484) (1.756) (1.800)
loggdp -0.167*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.168*** -0.141** -0.146**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.059) (0.062) (0.063)
logpop 0.237*** 0.243*** 0.241*** 0.255** 0.297** 0.295**
(0.083) (0.084) (0.086) (0.126) (0.128) (0.127)
polity2 -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
depend -0.263* -0.226 -0.187
(0.141) (0.144) (0.145)
lagopenness 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.121***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
aidpc 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
war 0.014*** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.005)
urban -0.004* -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 907 907 907 758 733 733
# countries 127 127 127 112 109 109
R2 0.141 0.149 0.156 0.199 0.212 0.205
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 15: No log variables: OECD, 1964-1983
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv -2.597 224.079*** 199.011*** 171.545*** 138.859*** -10.885
(4.765) (52.605) (42.978) (47.316) (50.520) (71.015)
importdiv×gdp -11.307*** -9.589*** -11.945*** -6.524** -7.906***
(2.599) (2.171) (2.483) (2.633) (2.829)
diffr -32.698*** -91.973***
(10.073) (26.365)
importdiv×diffr 136.335**
(63.470)
diffl -55.650*** -161.316***
(17.955) (39.257)
importdiv×diffl 213.220***
(78.660)
gdp -9.193*** -4.214* -4.587** -3.189 -6.172** -5.139**
(2.196) (2.278) (2.190) (2.391) (2.371) (2.495)
pop 13.025*** 12.880*** 11.119*** 9.200** 11.153*** 8.564**
(4.527) (4.095) (4.114) (4.309) (4.066) (4.278)
depend 7.984 10.082** 13.319** 12.134** 13.516** 12.831**
(5.074) (4.598) (5.131) (5.162) (5.371) (5.307)
polity2 0.176*** 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.159***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052)
urban 0.149** 0.104 0.112 0.102 0.119 0.115
(0.073) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.073) (0.071)
war 0.460 -0.369 -0.258 -0.330 -0.223 -0.264
(0.337) (0.359) (0.336) (0.351) (0.359) (0.379)
lagopenness 0.023 -0.001 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.008
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 124 124 124 124 124 124
# countries 26 26 26 26 26 26
R2 0.592 0.670 0.690 0.700 0.697 0.711
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 16: Arellano-Bond GMM estimation: OECD, 1964-1983
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
laggovshare 0.465*** 0.392*** 0.411** 0.306** 0.420** 0.336**
(0.116) (0.124) (0.171) (0.148) (0.164) (0.151)
importdiv -0.363* 6.637*** 6.141*** 4.669*** 5.465** -0.964
(0.190) (2.141) (2.130) (1.744) (2.390) (2.403)
importdiv×loggdp -0.349*** -0.321*** -0.374*** -0.284** -0.303***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.085) (0.122) (0.103)
diffr -3.464***
(0.674)
importdiv×diffr 5.294***
(1.253)
diffl -0.453 -4.972***
(0.917) (1.221)
importdiv×diffl 8.348***
(1.909)
loggdp -0.267*** -0.181*** -0.256*** -0.199** -0.260*** -0.243**
(0.098) (0.068) (0.084) (0.095) (0.087) (0.097)
logpop 0.663*** 0.687*** 0.567*** 0.382** 0.535*** 0.410**
(0.169) (0.174) (0.167) (0.180) (0.173) (0.187)
polity2 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
depend 0.133 0.158 0.171 0.228 0.187 0.206
(0.170) (0.160) (0.191) (0.185) (0.191) (0.196)
lagopenness -0.015 -0.072 -0.016 -0.049
(0.063) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061)
war 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.006
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
urban 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 98 98 98 98 98 98
# countries 26 26 26 26 26 26
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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B Appendix
Table 18: Elasticity of substitution: sample means
Broda and Weinstein (2006)’s
estimated elasticity of substitution
Rauch’s classification 1972-1988 1990-2001
differentiated goods 5.2 4.7
reference priced goods 7.8 4.9
goods on organized exchange 15.3 11.6
Source: Broda and Weinstein (2006)
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Table 19: Data and Sources
Variable Description Source
g log-share of government consumption to
real GDP (in %) from Penn World Tables
6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
loggdp log real GDP (Laspeyeres method in
2000 prices) from Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
logpop log of total population in thousands from
Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
importdiv number of different imported 4-digit
products (Standard International trade
classification, Rev. 2), normalized 0-1
World Trade Data (Feenstra and Lipsey,
2005) http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/
undata/undata.html
diffr share of differentiated on total imported
products
Rauch (1999) and World Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey, 2005)
diffl share of differentiated plus share of ref-
erence priced on total imported products
Rauch (1999) and World Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey, 2005)
polity2 Composite Polity index ranging from -
10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consoli-
dated democracy)
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
depend Dependency ratio is the share of popula-
tion below 15 and beyond 64 to the pop-
ulation between 15 and 64 from World
Development Indicators
World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
urban The share of total population living in
urban areas from World Development In-
dicators
World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
war ACTOTAL from Major Episodes of Po-
litical Violence (MEPV) and conflict re-
gions, range from 0 (no violence) to 10
http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm
lagopenness log-share of export plus import to real
GDP (in %) from Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
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Table 20: List of Countries
Afghanistan Djibouti Laos Samoa
Albania Dominican Republic Latvia Saudi Arabia
Algeria Ecuador Lebanon Senegal
Angola Egypt Liberia Seychelles
Argentina El Salvador Lithuania Sierra Leone
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Macedonia Singapore
Australia Estonia Madagascar Slovak Republic
Austria Ethiopia Malawi Slovenia
Azerbaijan Fiji Malaysia Somalia
Bahamas Finland Mali South Africa
Bahrain France Malta Spain
Bangladesh Gabon Mauritania Sri Lanka
Barbados Gambia Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis
Belarus Georgia Mexico Sudan
Belgium Germany Mongolia Suriname
Belize Ghana Morocco Sweden
Benin Greece Mozambique Switzerland
Bermuda Guatemala Nepal Syria
Bolivia Guinea Netherlands Taiwan
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Antilles Tajikistan
Brazil Guyana New Zealand Tanzania
Burkina Faso Haiti Nicaragua Thailand
Burundi Honduras Niger Togo
Cambodia Hungary Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon Iceland Norway Tunisia
Canada India Oman Turkey
Central African Republic Indonesia Pakistan Turkmenistan
Chad Iran Panama Uganda
Chile Iraq Papua New Guinea Ukraine
China Ireland Paraguay United Arab Emirates
Colombia Israel Peru United Kingdom
Costa Rica Italy Philippines United States
Cote d‘Ivoire Jamaica Poland Uruguay
Croatia Japan Portugal Uzbekistan
Cuba Jordan Qatar Venezuela
Cyprus Kenya Republic of Korea Vietnam
Czech Republic Kiribati Romania Yemen
Dem. Rep. Korea Kuwait Russia Zambia
Denmark Kyrgyzstan Rwanda Zimbabwe
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